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Saturday, July 18, 2020 | History

4 edition of Moral hazard and persistence found in the catalog.

Moral hazard and persistence

Hugo AndreМЃs Hopenhayn

Moral hazard and persistence

by Hugo AndreМЃs Hopenhayn

  • 165 Want to read
  • 20 Currently reading

Published by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in [Richmond, Va.] .
Written in English


Edition Notes

StatementHugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque.
SeriesWorking paper -- no. 07-7, Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond : Online) -- no. 07-7.
ContributionsJarque, Arantxa., Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
Classifications
LC ClassificationsHB1
The Physical Object
FormatElectronic resource
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL16390121M
LC Control Number2007615344

Search the world's most comprehensive index of full-text books. My library. Abstract. How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiationproofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency by exploiting natural comparisons across states.

We study a multiperiod principal-agent problem with moral hazard in which effort is persistent: the agent is required to exert effort only in the initial period of the contract, and this effort determines the conditional distribution of output in the following periods. We provide a characterization of the optimal dynamic compensation scheme. As in a static moral hazard problem, consumption. Book Description: Moral hazard--the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others--is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow's seminal paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and.

The amazing thing to me is that this book was written in I hadn’t heard of the concept of moral hazard until the Global Financial Crisis of , but had I read this book before that time, I would have been much better prepared to understand what was happening in , and to grasp the implications of propping up dodgy financial institutions deemed too big to fail/5(28). reinforced by the persistence and even the spread The combination of MSV with limited liability leads to systemic moral hazard. the shareholders of corporations benefit from Book. Jan ;.


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Moral hazard and persistence by Hugo AndreМЃs Hopenhayn Download PDF EPUB FB2

(PDF) Moral hazard and persistence | Hugo Hopenhayn - is a platform for academics to share research papers.

Moral Hazard and Persistence Hugo Hopenhayn Department of Economics UCLA Arantxa Jarque Department of Economics U. Moral hazard and persistence book Alicante PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE Abstract We study a multiperiod principal-agent problem with moral haz-ard in which the agent is required to exert e⁄ort only in the initial period of the contract.

"Repeated moral hazard with persistence," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol.

25(4), pagesJune. MUKOYAMA, Toshihiko &. Repeated moral hazard with persistence. Authors; Authors and affiliations; Toshihiko Mukoyama; Ayşegül Şahin; Article.

Summary. This paper considers the optimal contract when the current (hidden) action of an agent has a persistent effect on the future outcome. The optimal contract in a two-effort choice, two-period setting is characterized.

moral hazard. As a consequence, Moral hazard and persistence book optimal consumption pro file is observationally equivalent to that of a related problem without persistence.

This suggests that the presence of persistence does not necessarily change the properties of optimal contracts. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D30, D31, D80, D Repeated moral hazard with persistence This paper considers the optimal contract when the current (hidden) action of an agent has a persistent effect on the future outcome.

The optimal contract in a two-effort choice, two-period setting is characterized analytically and numerically. I study a problem of repeated moral hazard where the effect of effort is persistent over time: each period's outcome distribution is a function of a geometrically distributed lag of past efforts.

I show that when the utility of the agent is linear in effort, a simple rearrangement of terms in his lifetime utility translates this problem into a.

A moral hazard hypothesis for losing persistence is examined, as well as the effectiveness of the takeover market in disciplining persistent losers. Results indicate significant performance persistence, with firms in the sample 16 times more likely to remain in an initial position as a winner, or loser, than to switch.

Moral Hazard and Persistent Private Information Bruno Strulovici September 5, Abstract How does renegotiation a ect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persis-tent private information and moral hazard.

This paper introduces a concept of renegotiation. When the analysis distinctly accounts for both the patient and the insurer shares of expenditure, the estimated coefficients directly reject the altruism and moral hazard hypotheses. Instead, we find strong and robust evidence of habits persistence in prescribing branded drugs.

Repeated moral hazard with persistence Article (PDF Available) in Economic Theory 25(4) February with 47 Reads How we measure 'reads'. The existing literature in repeated moral hazard with persistence consists of di⁄erent proposals of assumptions aimed at simplifying the problem along ei- ther one, or both, of those dimensions, in order to provide a characterization of the contract with persistence.

S&L performance persistence, moral hazard and market discipline. Repeated Moral Hazard with Effort Persistence Arantxa Jarque.

Download paper. I study a problem of repeated moral hazard in which the effect of effort is persistent over time: each period's outcome distribution is a function of a geometrically distributed lag of past efforts.

I show that when the utility of the agent is linear in effort, a. Moral Hazard and Persistence. Hugo Hopenhayn and Arantxa Jarque. Download paper. We study a multiperiod principal-agent problem with moral hazard in which effort is persistent: the agent is required to exert effort only in the initial period of the contract, and this effort determines the conditional distribution of output in the following periods.

Keywords: dynamic moral hazard, persistent private information, real options, principal-agent model. JEL Classification: D82, D Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation. Vasama, Suvi, On Moral Hazard and Persistent Private Information (August 4, ).

Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 15/   Accountants call the difference between market value and book value “goodwill,” but that is just a label for their ignorance.

Moral Hazard 7: Measurements Are Lagging. Imagine driving your car with your dashboard gauges informing you of last month’s speed, fuel level, temperature, oil pressure, RPMs and the rest.

@ARTICLE{Mukoyama05repeatedmoral, author = {Toshihiko Mukoyama}, title = {Repeated Moral Hazard with Persistence}, journal = {Economic Theory}, year = {}, pages = {}} Share. OpenURL. Abstract. This paper considers the optimal contract when the current (hidden) action of an agent has a persistent effect on the future outcome.

This approach shows that self-correcting reports are optimal off the equilibrium path. The paper also discusses the case of partially pooling contracts and of permanent outside options for the agent, illustrating the interaction between cash flow persistence, renegotiation, moral hazard, and information revelation.

CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): We study a multiperiod principal-agent problem with moral hazard in which effort is persistent: the agent is required to exert effort only in the initial period of the contract, and this effort determines the conditional distribution of output in the following periods.

Repeated Moral Hazard with Persistence. By Toshihiko Mukoyama. Abstract. This paper considers the optimal contract when the current (hidden) action of an agent has a persistent effect on the future outcome. In this setting, the current outcome is not only a signal of the current action taken by the agent, but also conveys information about his.Moral Hazard and Persistent Private Information Bruno Strulovici Septem Abstract How does renegotiation shape contracts between a principal and an agent sub-ject to persistent private information and moral hazard?

This paper introduces a concept of renegotiation-proofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of.Snake was a New York Times Notable Book of the Year, as was Moral Hazard. Both books contain strong autobiographical elements, Snake being about a girl growing up on a Riverina farm in the s, and Moral Hazard about a couple facing Alzheimer's in the husband while the wife works as a speechwriter on Wall Street.